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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-Labor Law-Exemption of Union from
Antitrust Laws Is Lost When It Imposes Minimum
Price Levels on a Member-Employer
Acting on their own initiative, the plaintiffs, union member'
musicians, periodically2 secured jobs through union controlled booking
agents as orchestra leaders for single engagements. 3 The orchestras
were staffed with musicians obtained from the union hiring hall, and
plaintiffs exercised typical management functions with respect to these

employees. 4 With virtual control of labor in the music industry,'

the defendant union unilaterally established minimum prices which6
leaders were required to charge purchasers of orchestra services.

Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that this procedureO constituted a
price-fixing conspiracy between the defendant union and non-labor
1. Subsequent to the filing of their suit, two of the plaintiffs were expelled from
defendant union for various reasons, including failure to abide by the union wage
scale. Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 870 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
2. The term "periodically" is used here to denote the high degree of fluidity in
this line of work: a few musicians acted solely as leaders; others acted as leaders
occasionally, some rarely, and most never. Thus, the average leader spent most of
his time as a band musician, but occasionally he secured a club date (single engagement) as an orchestra leader. Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 372 F.2d 155
(2d Cir. 1967).
3. Single engagements characteristically last but one night. These are distinguished
from "steady" engagements which extend for a longer period, usually a week. The
latter are governed by collective bargaining agreements between the union and the
purchasers. The former are not. However, both are subject to the same degree of
union regulation-the latter by collective bargaining agreements and the former by
unilateral union coercion. In both types of engagements the union regards the leader
as an employee or personnel manager, and the purchaser as the employer. 372 F.2d at
160.
4. Among the responsibilities of the leaders are: collecting the fee, paying the
musicians, supervising their performance and conduct, keeping records and withholding
taxes. The instant court concluded that, since the leaders were no different from
any other independent contractor, they were employers. 372 F.2d at 159.
5. 372 F.2d at 158. Unionization of the leaders has been a prime goal for several
years. The high degree of success is reflected by the fact that unless the leader is a
union member no union musicians may play for him.
6. All terms of employment and the details of working as a leader were unilaterally
imposed by the union, and enforced by threats of expulsion. 372 F.2d at 160.
7. The minimum price consisted of the union wage-scale for members of the band
and the leader. Plaintiffs objected to that portion which represented scale for leaders.
since it prevented them from bargaining with the purchaser for a lower total price.
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groups in violation of the Sherman Act.8 Defendant contended that

such conduct was within labor's exemption from the antitrust laws;
the district court upheld the defendants and dismissed the complaintY
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held,
reversed. A union which unilaterally imposes minimum prices upon

employer-members and coerces them to charge such prices loses its
exemption from the antitrust laws and engages in price-fixing in
violation of the Sherman Act. Carroll v. American Federation of
Musicians, 372 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W.
3143 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967) (Nos. 309 & 310).
Although price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, 10
a prerequisite" for liability of a labor union under the Act is a finding
that the union has acted outside of the broad exemption granted to
labor by the Clayton 2 and Norris-LaGuardia 13 Acts. The NorrisLaGuardia Act' provides immunity from injunctive proceedings in
federal courts and from liability for substantive violations of the antitrust laws, 14 requiring only that the activity in issue arise in the
context of a "labor dispute." The Act defines a "labor dispute" to
include any controversy concerning efforts to negotiate, fix, maintain,
or change the terms or conditions of employment. 15 Expanding upon
this definition the Supreme Court has interpreted the exemption to
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964): Section 1: "Every contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states . . . is declared
." Section 2: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
to be illegal ....
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize

any part of the trade or commerce among the several states . . . shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor.....
9. 241 F. Supp. at 890-91.
10. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-14, 218 (1940) (rule
of reason inapplicable and no further inquiry required where price-fixing involved);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1927) (reasonableness
immaterial).
11. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691
(1965); Handler, Recent Antitrust Development-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 823, 830-33
(1965).
12. Clayton Act §§ 6, 20, 15 U.S.C. § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964), provide that
labor is not a commodity or article of commerce, and restrict the issuance of injunctions by federal courts. For the proposition that these statutory commands were
ignored or diluted, see e.g., Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary
Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955); Note, Collective Bargaining Under the
Antitrust Laws, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 156 (1966).
13. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964), restricts the jurisdiction of
federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes.
14. The statute refers only to injunctive immunity, but the Supreme Court read
the exemption from substantive violations into the law in United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219 (1941).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1964). For general construction of the definition,
TO STUDY THE ANncompare REPORT OF T=E ATTORNEY GENERAL'S Co! uiTE
TRUST LAws 295-99 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Aar'y GE. ANTInRUST REP.], with
Cox, supra note 12, at 267.
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mean that if a union acts in its own self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, its activity will be exempt from the operation
of the antitrust laws.16 With these requirements for the immunity
thus established, 1 7 the courts have focused their attention upon defining the scope of labor's exemption.' 8 In Teamsters Local 24 v.
Oliver,19 the union compelled a trucking company to pay fixed
amounts to union member independent truck owners who performed
the same function as union member employee-drivers. In holding
that a state's antitrust law could not be applied to this situation, the
Supreme Court noted that the issue in dispute was a proper subject
of collective bargaining between the carrier and the union. The
Court stated that the union had a substantial interest in procuring
such a term, since the independent owners were in job competition
with the carrier's employee-drivers, and concluded that this practice
constituted wage determination rather than price fixing.20 However,
in Local 626, Meat Drivers Unior v. United States,"' the absence of
an "economic interrelationship" between self-employed grease peddlers who were union members and the unionized employees of the
grease processors, led the Supreme Court to conclude that no labor
dispute existed.2 2 Accordingly, the Court found an illegal combination
between the peddlers and the union to fix prices charged to the
processors in restraint of trade. In the most recent of its efforts to
accommodate the antitrust and labor laws, the Supreme Court in
16. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1941). See generally, Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley
Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1094 (1962).
17. There is some question as to the existence of yet another requirement-whether
the exemption is lost if one of the parties to the dispute is an "employer" or "independent contractor." Compare Taylor v. Local 7, Journeymen Horseshoers, 353 F.2d
593, 605-06 (4th Cir. 1965) (exemption does not apply to independent contractors),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 969 (1966), and Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315
U.S. 143, 147 (1942) (dictum) (exemption does not apply), with 29 U.S.C. § 113(c)
(1964), which states that a labor dispute exists "regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." See note 27 infra
for further discussion.
18. For a general discussion, see Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After
Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 CoLms. L. REv. 742 (1966); Note, Labor Law and
Antitrust: "So Deceptive and Opaque Are the Elements of These Problems," 1966
D=n L.J. 191.
19. 358 U.S. 283 (1959), retrg 167 Ohio St. 299, 147 N.E.2d 856 (1958).
20. 358 U.S. at 294. It should be noted that there was no claim that any federal
laws had been violated. Id. at 286.
21. 371 U.S. 94 (1962).
22. The union and the peddlers had admitted the violations charged. In finding
no "economic interrelationship" between the peddlers and the processors' regular
employees, the Court relied on an extensive stipulation of facts, which stated that no
processor had ever substituted peddlers for employee-drivers, or had threatened to
do so. 371 U.S. at 98. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the Court
held there was no labor dispute. See generally, Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective
Bargaining,and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 659, 678-87 (1965).
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Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,23 found no
violation of the Sherman Act in a dispute concerning marketing hours.
The Court was unable to agree on a majority opinion, but two
groups of three Justices each concurred in the result. In the first
opinion, Mr. Justice White indicated that since the matter in dispute
was a subject intimately related to terms and conditions of employment, the union's insistence upon it did not violate the antitrust laws.24
Concurring in the result, Mr. Justice Goldberg took issue with Mr.
justice White's "narrow confining view"25 and proposed a broader test
whereby all subjects of mandatory bargaining would be exempt from
the operation of the antitrust laws. However, this broad exemption
proposed by Mr. Justice Goldberg would not extend to price fixing
because the union clearly lacks a "direct and overriding" interest 26 in
such a subject.
In the instant case the court first examined the question of whether
the union had lost its exemption from the antitrust laws. Referring to
Mr. Justice Goldberg's test in Jewel Tea, the court stated that absent
an illegal conspiracy, all subjects of mandatory collective bargaining
possess immunity from antitrust violations. After finding no evidence
of a conspiracy, the court held that the prices charged for orchestral
engagements were not a subject of such "direct and overriding
interest" to the union in its capacity as representative of the musicians
to make it a subject of mandatory collective bargaining. The court
reasoned that the establishment of minimum price floors could not
be justified on the grounds that the union was also the representative
of the leaders, since the court deemed the leaders to be employers.2?7
Furthermore, the court rejected the union's contention that it was
directly interested in the prices charged by the leaders due to the
fact that the prices represented the limit of the wages which could
be expected from an engagement. The court noted that giving effect
to such an argument would interfere with managements prerogative
of setting prices, and effectively "paralyze" the antitrust laws, since
that same argument "would support union-instigated price-fixing in
23. 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (no opinion of the Court), noted in 18 VAND. L. Rzv, 2027
(1965).
24. 381 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added).
25. 381 U.S. at 727.
26. 381 U.S. at 732-33.
27. It is submitted that the characterization of one party to the dispute as an
"independent contractor," "businessman" or "entrepreneur" is but the ultimate label
applied by the court when it finds that the union lacks a sufficient interest in the
affairs of the party to impose terms upon him or combine with him to affect the
market. See Local 626, Meat Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962),
where the party is characterized as a businessman after a finding of no interest by the
union in his conduct, and the lack of an "economic interrelationship" between him
and the union's members.
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any industry."28 In distinguishing the Oliver 9 case, the court stated
that no "economic interrelationship" existed in the instant case since
30
the leaders did not compete with the staff musicians for positions.
With the lack of the union's interest established, the court held that
the union had unilaterally acted on a matter which was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining, and had thus lost its exemption
from the Sherman Act. The court then held that the establishment of
these price floors was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.31 In his
dissent, Judge Friendly maintained that the majority had failed to
take adequate account of the music trade with its "high degree of
interchangeability in work functions and competition among union
members for posts as leaders."- Noting that a different result might
have been warranted had the union fixed the price high enough to
insure a return of entrepreneurial profit, Judge Friendly concluded
that the union had merely set a minimum price floor in order to protect
proper union objectives.
Any assessment of the instant decision must be bottomed on a
clear understanding of the policies sought to be achieved by Congress
in the passage of the antitrust and labor laws. The antitrust laws
seek to ensure a product market characterized by competition, with
prices being determined by supply and demand. The labor laws,
which include labor's exemption to the antitrust laws, seek to provide
the conditions for unions to bargain on a rough parity with management, and recognize the probability that this goal can be reached only
by permitting unions to achieve a kind of monopoly in the labor
market.3 The source of the court's difficulty in the instant case is
this "fundamental conflict between the policies underlying labor and
antitrust legislation."3 Basic to the solution of the problems posed
28. 372 F.2d at 165.
29. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
30. The court stated that the leaders frequently did not play with the orchestra,
and thus they were not in competition with the musicians; moreover, when the
leaders did play with the orchestra, their reputation often enhanced the demand
for the group, thus creating more jobs.
31. The court failed to articulate which section of the Act had been violated. Two
possibilities appear: (1) on a § 1 combination in restraint of trade, see V. CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANrTIRUST LAws 20-26 (1963); (2) for recent discussions of § 2
violations see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Handler,
Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking-Nineteenth Annual Review, 76 YALE
L.J. 92 (1966).
32. 372 F.2d at 168-69.
33. See generally, ATr'y GEN. ANTrRusT REP. 5-12; CisE, supra note 31, at 2-14;
Goldberg, Unions and the Antitrust Laws, 7 LAB. L.J. 178 (1956).
34. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 808 (1945); Comment,
Labor's Antitrust Exemption After Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 742
(1966). Cases in which the product and labor markets are identical clearly illustrate
the unsatisfactory results which efforts at harmonization of these policies have produced. See Comment, supra note 18, at 759; Rubenstein, The Emerging Antitrust
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by the instant case is the determination of which of these competing
policies should prevail. Although both the union and the occasional
entrepreneur have legitimate interests at stake, full protection of the
union's interests, and those of its members, requires that some control
of wages be permitted.-3 Since the union seeks to maintain its
"wage" scale by preventing "auction block" tactics by purchasers of
services, the result of prohibiting the union from regulating this
scale by "price" or "cwage" fixing,3 7 will be to induce competition

between or among musicians who desire to be leaders. The effect of
this will be to force such competitors out of the union and to reduce
the economic resources available for payment of wages, both of which
will reduce the number of unionized musicians utilized in orchestras.
Thus, the ultimate impact is a severe weakening of the unions. 38 The
fundamental factor in this case, and in similar situations in many other
Implications of Mandatory Bargaining, 50 MAIQ. L. REv. 50 (1966); Note, supra
note 18, 191. But in spite of the morass of conflict contained in the cases, the
Jewel Tea opinions may produce some agreement. Mr. Justice White, while proposing that immunity exists only where the matter in dispute is intimately related
to terms and conditions of employment, evidently would not include all subjects of
mandatory bargaining within his view of the exemption. However, he did approve
of the result in Oliver where the Court found the dispute to be a proper subject
of collective bargaining because there existed an economic interrelationship. Mr.
Justice Goldberg's broader view of the exemption would encompass all subjects of
mandatory bargaining, which indirectly must approve of the holding in Oliver. Thus
one can contend that the sole task of the court in Carroll was to determine the
existence or non-existence of an economic interrelationship between the leaders and
the musicians. If this view of the law is adopted, such a relationship seems clearly
to have existed. If a leader secures an engagement for his orchestra, another
musician is preempted from doing so. If the leader then performs with his orchestra,
one less musician is required. If in seeking engagements the leader is not bound by
a union-determined minimum price or wage, then other musicians must sell their
services for less in order to compete.
35. Similarly, there are public interests to be served by sustaining the result in the
instant case. Individuals will be encouraged to seek out opportunities for themselves,
and competition within labor groups will force wages, and therefore prices, downward
(assuming the lowering of wages is in the public interest). Additionally, by prohibiting
union domination of prices, employers are denied the benefit of labor's exemption
from the antitrust laws. Otherwise, the leaders would be permitted to do something
in the name of union "interest" which they could not do among themselves.
36. Bernhardt, supra note 16, at 1106 & n.54.
37. The Carroll court stressed statements by Justices White and Goldberg in Jewel
Tea which refer to price fixing as violative of the antitrust laws. See 381 U.S. at 689
& 733 for the statements. These generalizations become significant, however, only
after the activity is characterized as price rather than wage-fixing. It is suggested
that even the more restrictive view of Mr. Justice White would not have labelled the
conduct here as price-fixing. As he stated in Jewel Tea, "[t]he crucial determinant is
not the form of the agreement-e.g., prices or wages-but its relative impact on the
product market and the interests of union members." 381 U.S. at 690 n.5.
38. See the Supreme Court's discussion in the Oliver case, 358 U.S. at 292-94.
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trade unions,3 9 is that the objecting individuals have more attributes
of "workers" than "employers." Thus the union is seeking to impose
the minimum amount that can be charged by a unionized worker who
temporarily and irregularly divorces himself from the ranks of the
worker and becomes an "employer."40 It is suggested that so long as
the interests of this quasi-employer are primarily united with those
of the union and its members, the national labor policy is promoted
by allowing the union to control his wages. When, however, a
worker reaches the point where his basic sympathies and interests
do not lie with the union and its objectives, but with the entrepreneurial aspects of individual enterprise, then the union should no

longer be permitted to dictate the price that he must charge for his
services. 41 Rather than first considering the employment relationship

of the leaders to their musicians, and then applying a label which
controls the result, the suggested approach would be to first consider

the relation of the leaders to the union and its interests. The fact
that the leaders were acting as entrepreneurs should have been
considered only in determining the unity of interest of the leaders
and the union, rather than being given controlling effect. A broad
application of the approach taken by the court in the instant case
39. See generally, Taylor v. Local 7, Journeymen Horseshoers, 353 F.2d 593 (1965);
Note, Employee Bargaining Power Under the Norris-LaGuardiaAct: The Independent
Contractor Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 98 (1957) (independent contractors generally);
Comment, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 733 (1957) (barbers).
40. It is doubtful that the unions would have permitted continued employment of
the plaintiffs as musicians in the instant case without compliance by them with the
union's wage or price-fixing proposals. The union would probably have sought to
force unionized employers to hire only union recommended labor, which they could
do under the NLRA. The same is true in Oliver- See Orange Belt Dist. Council No.
48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (clauses limiting subcontracting
to employers meeting union standards upheld). Cf. Meat & Highway Drivers (Swift
& Co.), 143 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1229-30 (1963), enforced in part, Teamsters Local 710
v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1964), which restricted the union's power to
protecting jobs formerly held by members.
41. This is not to suggest that a union be permitted to impose selling prices on a
merchant. "In such a case, the restraint on the product market is direct and immediate,
is of the type characteristically deemed unreasonable under the Sherman Act and the
union gets from the promise nothing more concrete than a hope for better wages to
come." 381 U.S. at 663 (White, J.). Such a situation obviously defeats the purposes
of the Sherman Act without corresponding furtherance of the Norris-LaGuardia policy
of exempting unions when they are attempting to create a monopoly of labor within
their labor market. Applied to the instant case the approach suggested would no
longer subject to union control the two leaders who have left the union and now
devote full time to orchestra leading. The other two would be subject to such control.
Compare Cox, supra note 12, at 272-74, with Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme
Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 80 (1965); see Note, Employee Bargaining
Power Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act: The Independent Contractor Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 98, 104 (1957) (price-fixing should not be allowed to extend to fixing a
profit).
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will render many trade unions impotent. 42 Congressional policies
require that this approach be quickly abandoned, either by legislative
response or reversal by the Supreme Court. With the passage of
two years since Jewel Tea, and a change in the composition of the
Court, perhaps a more definitive statement will greet the next case
which presents antitrust-labor law questions.

Civil Rights-Desegregation-School

Authorities

Have Afirmative Duty To Integrate School System

Negro children in six Louisiana and three Alabama school systems
brought class actions' in the appropriate federal district courts attacking state-imposed de jure segregation based upon dual attendance
zones for white and Negro students.2 In each case a court order was
entered against the defendant school authorities which directed the

implementation of a gradual desegregation plan. The cases were
consolidated on appeal by the plaintiffs to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals.3 A three judge panel, applying as a minimum standard
guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, reversed the orders of the district courts,4 enjoined the defendants from practicing racial discrimination in the operation of their
schools, and ordered them to take appropriate action to desegregate
the public schools by the school year 1967-68, by implementing a
42. For example, the union will be unable to control the member who as an
electrician occasionally secures a job as a subcontractor, or the businessman-plumber
who works alongside his workers.
1. The United States joined in most of these cases as party plaintiff after suit was
filed.
2. Seven of the nine school districts involved had a combined school population of
155,782, of which 59,361 were Negro in 1965. Yet only 0.019 per cent of the Negro
school population attended formerly "white" schools in 1965. United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 853 (5th Cir. 1966).
3. The defendants contended that neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000c(9), 2000d-2000d(4), imposed upon
school authorities an affirmative duty to achieve public school integration, and that freedom of choice plans were adequate.
4. In a 2-1 decision the court held that standards for court supervised desegregation
should not be lower than the standard set by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 80 (1964); U.S. OFFICE OF EDUc., HEW, GENERAL STATEm-ENT OF POLICiES UNDER TITLE vi OF THE Civu. RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 RESPECTING
DESEGREGATION OF ELEmENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (April 1965) (hereinafter
cited as HEW 1965 STATEMENT); U.S. OFFICE OF EDUC., HEW, REviSED STATFMENT
OF POLICIES FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS UNDER TrrILE vi OF THE CiviL RIGHTS
ACT or 1964 (March 1966) (hereinafter cited as HEW REVISED STATEMENT), under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition, the court held that school authorities were
under an affirmative duty to integrate. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
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mandatory freedom of choice plan. On petition by the defendants
for a rehearing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc,
held, affirmed.5 State school authorities have an affirmative duty
under the fourteenth amendment to integrate facilities, faculties,
activities, and students of public schools formerly segregated on a
de jure6 basis and the minimum standard to be applied by the courts
in achieving integration is the HEW guidelines. United States v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
In Brown v. Board of Education,7 the Supreme Court held that

racial discrimination in public schools is unconstitutional and that the
primary responsibility for assessing and solving the problems inherent
in desegregating public schools is upon the school authorities. Notwithstanding this constitutional mandate, nine years later only token
progress had been made toward the desegregation of public schools
in many areas of the South.8 This situation contributed to the enactment of Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 which were
intended to expedite desegregation. To make Title VI effective, the
5. The previous opinion was adopted with a few clarifying statements and slight
modifications were made in the decree. The decree provided in essence that all grades
would be desegregated by the school year of 1967-68 and that all students or their
parents were to exercise a mandatory annual free choice specifying the school they
choose to attend and that no choice is to be denied for any reason other than overcrowding, in which case students who lived closer to the chosen school would be given
preference. No preference is to be given for prior attendance at any school, and all
services, facilities, faculties, and activities must be operated without discrimination.
Transportation is to be provided to serve each student choosing any school in the
system. Any student shall have a right to transfer to any school to which he was or
would be excluded upon the basis of race. At no time is any official or employee of
the school system to influence any student or parent in the exercise of a choice or
impose a penalty or grant favors because of any choice made. In addition any
formerly Negro school which is not made equal to formerly white schools in physical
facilities, faculties and course of instruction is to be closed.
6. The court distihiguishes between de jure and de facto segregation. At the initial
hearing of the case the court states: "In this circuit . . . the location of Negro schools
with Negro faculties in Negro neighborhoods and white schools in white neighborhoods
cannot be described as unfortunate fortuity: It came into existence as state action and
continues to exist as racial gerrymandering, made possible by the dual system. Segregation resulting from racially motivated gerrymandering is properly characterized as
'de jure' segregation." United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836,
876 (5th Cir. 1966). In regard to de facto segregation the court noted, "[D]e facto
segregation . . . [is] . . . racial imbalance resulting fortuitously in a school system
based on a single neighborhood school serving all white and Negro children in a
certain attendance area or neighborhood." Id. at 852.
7. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
8. In the school year of 1963-64 only 1.17 percent of the Negro children..
'the
South were attending school -with white children. United States v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d-836, app. B (5th'Cir. 1966).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000d-2000d(4). Title IV authorizes the Office of Education to give technical and financial assistance to schools attempting to desegregate;
Title VI provides that federal aid and assistance shall be denied to school systems
practicing racial discrimination. Section 2000d states: "No person in the United States
shajl, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
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Department of Health, Education and Welfare promulgated regula-

tions which conditioned a state's eligibility for federal funds upon

compliance with provisions of the Act. 10 State school authorities
could satisfy this condition by obtaining a federal court order providing a plan for desegregation or, in the alternative, by submitting an
acceptable desegregation plan to the Commissioner of Education.
Pursuant to this regulation, the Office of Education in April 196511
and in March 196212 issued guidelines promulgating a standard of
desegregation which established the fall of 1967 as the target date for
total desegregation. To avoid having to implement the guidelines
many school boards sought refuge in the federal courts, 3 and obtained
orders providing for desegregation plans which occasionally differed
significantly from the guidelines. However, in Singleton v. Jackson
Municipal Separate School Districts,14 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the HEW guidelines are only the minimum standard
to be applied by the federal courts in evaluating school board desegregation plans, and that school authorities "are under the constitutional
compulsion of furnishing a single, integrated school system."' 5 But,
there still remained some doubt as to whether school authorities
operating under court-approved freedom of choice plans bad an
affirmative duty to achieve integration,' 6 even though in cases inbe denied the benefits of. or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Section 2000d-1 states: "Each Federal
department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any
program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of
section 2000d of this title with respect to such programs or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of federal applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection
with which the action is taken ...."
10. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(a)(1) (1964): "Every application for federal financial assistance to carry out a program to which this part applies . . .shall, as a condition
to its approval .. .contain or be accompanied by an assurance that the program will
be conducted or the facility operated in compliance with all requirements imposed by
or pursuant to this part." There are various programs to which this part applies.
11. HEW 1965 STATEMENT.
12. HEW REVISED STATEMENT.
13. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 859 (5th Cir.
1968): "The announcement in HEW regulations that the Commissioner would accept
a final school desegregation order as proof of the schoors eligibility for federal aid
prompted a number of schools to seek refuge in the federal courts. In Louisiana alone
twenty school boards obtained quick decrees providing for desegregation according to
plans greatly at variance with the Guidelines." See Price v. Denison Independent
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965); Singleton v. Jackson
Municipal Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966).
14. Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (.5th Cir.
1966). See Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1965); Smith v. Board of Edue.
of Morrilton School Dist. No. 32, 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966); cf. Price v. Denison
Independent School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965).
15. Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865, 869 (5th
Cir. 1966).
16. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967),
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volving de jure segregation,
other courts had previously recognized
17
a duty to desegregate.
Recognizing that other courts have held that school authorities have
no affirmative duty to integrate in situations where segregation is de
facto,' the court in the instant case limited its consideration to the
duty of the state to eliminate de jure segregation. The court noted
that freedom of choice plans are frequently ineffective in eliminating
segregation, and that consequently schools operating under these plans
generally retained their racial identification. The majority concluded
that this failure resulted from a lack of transfers by white students to
Negro schools, from the requirement in these plans that affirmative
action be taken by parents and pupils to disestablish the existing
segregated system and from diminished Negro motivation to transfer
because of construction of and improvements to Negro schools. In
response to the defendants' contention 19 that the Constitution merely
prohibits compulsory segregation and does not require integration, the
majority rejected this distinction and held that school authorities have
an affirmative duty to convert former de jure dual systems into a
single integrated, unitary system. The court then noted that freedom
of choice plans offer only one means of accomplishing desegregation
and that if in any individual case it does not produce substantial
integration, school officials will be required to employ other methods.
The court concluded that in effecting a unitary system the courts
should cooperate with the coordinate branches of government and
as a minimum standard apply the HEW guidelines. The court was
careful to point out, however, that judicial responsibility was not
being shirked, since the HEW guidelines are consistent with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and satisfy the requirements of the United
States Constitution.'
17. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); see Dowell v. School Bd. of Okla.,
244 F. Supp. 971, 981 (W.D. Okla. 1965): "The duty to disestablish segregation is
clear .

.

. ,

where such school segregation policies were in force and their effects

have not been corrected."
18. See Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
914 (1964); Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963), aft'd, 324
F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
19. The defendants relied on a dictum in Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777
(E.D.S.C. 1955) where the court stated: "The Constitution, in other words does not
require integration. It merely forbids discrimination."
20. A slightly modified decree was attached to the opinion. Note 5 supra. judge
Coleman wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he asserted that "the true
answer remains [in disestablishing segregation], give him [the Negro student] absolute
freedom of choice and see to it that- he gets that choice in absolute good faith."
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
Three judges dissented, in separate opinions, taking the position that the de
facto-de jure distinction is improperly, made, that genuine freedom of choice is
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Although it may be said that the instant case is far reaching in its
result, a close analysis suggests that this may not be the actual effect.
The Singleton2 ' case had already established the HEW guidelines as
the minimum standard for courts to apply in evaluating school desegregation plans and indicated that more stringent measures may be
required if necessary to vindicate constitutional rights. Certainly a

similar announcement by the present decision should come as no great
surprise. The holding that school authorities have an affirmative
duty to achieve integration is not new when applied to instances of
de jure segregation, 2 although it is true that contrary holdings have
been announced in other circuits in cases of de facto segregation. 2
To the extent that the de facto-de jure distinction is accepted the
decision seems to have added nothing new to the law regarding school
desegregation. However, if the distinction proves to have been
improperly made, then a double constitutional standard will indeed
apply in various parts of the country.24 As pointed out by Judge
Coleman in his concurring opinion,25 the decision might also be
criticized for imposing an affirmative duty on school officials to integrate and at the same time preventing them from influencing a
student's free exercise of choice. However, this interpretation seems
to overlook the majority's point that the official's duty is not necessarily
to make a freedom of choice plan produce integration, but that it is
to employ some other method if the choice system fails to bring that
result. It is in this sense that the decision is significant. Thus school
authorities cannot satisfy constitutional requirements by implementation of an ineffective freedom of choice plan. Officials must insure
that dual systems are abolished either by removing all impediments
which obstruct the making of a truly free choice or by employing
some other method to achieve integration. The majority noted that
the proper solution to end racial discrimination and not compulsory integration, that
the applicability of the HEW guidelines in all cases is questionable, and that district
judges are left with too little discretion to formulate standards. Judge Gewin stated:
"The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, New York, or in
any other area of the nation which the opinion classifies under de facto segregation,
would receive little comfort from the assertion that the racial makeup of their school
system does not violate their constitutional rights because they were born into a
de facto society, while the exact same racial makeup of the school system in the 17
Southern and border states violates the constitutional rights of their counterparts, or
even their blood brothers, because they were born in a de 'ure society . . . . Basically,
all of them must be given the same constitutional protection."
21. Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.
1966).
22. Cases cited note 17 supra.
23. Cases cited note 18 supra.
24. Id. In both cases cited the Supreme Court denied certiorari, and on April 17,
1967, refused to delay enforcement of the decree of the Court of Appeals in the present
case. The decision was handed down without explanation.
25. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
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"a freedom of choice plan is but one of the tools available to school
officials at this stage of the process of converting the dual system of
separate schools for Negroes and whites into a unitary system." 26
Certainly this language foreshadows a changing process of public
school integration. It is possible that future desegregation plans will
be based entirely on geographical attendance areas, with public school
students having no choice but to attend the school nearest their place
of residence. The drawing of school district boundaries would have
to be accomplished upon some fair and impartial basis to avoid resegregation of the races. This appears to be the obvious solution in
cases of de jure segregation.7

Constitutional Law-Citizenship-Stripping
Congress of Its Right To Expatriate
In 1950 petitioner, a naturalized American citizen,' traveled to
Israel where he voluntarily voted in a 1951 election for the Israeli
Knesset.2 The Department of State thereafter refused to grant a
renewal of his United States passport on the ground that he had lost
his American citizenship by virtue of section 401(e) of the Nationality
Act of 1940 which provides that a United States citizen shall "lose"
his citizenship if he votes "in a political election in a foreign state."3
Petitioner brought an action for declaratory judgment alleging that
section 401(e) violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment
and the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 The District
Court' granted summary judgment for the government and the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit 6 affirmed. On writ of certiorari the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Under the fourteenth
26. Id.
27. It is interesting to note that the Fourth Circuit recently directed its district courts
to take notice of the present holding in regard to faculty integration. Bowman v.
- F.2d
- (4th Cir. 1967).
County School Bd.
1. Petitioner was born in Poland in 1893, emigrated to the United States in 1912,
and became a naturalized citizen in 1926.
2. The legislative body of Israel.
3. The Act states in relevant part: "A person who is a national of the United
States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . .. (e) Voting
in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to
determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." 54 Stat. 1168 (1940) (now Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1964)).
4. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States ..
5. 250 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
6. 361 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1966).
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amendment the federal government has no power to expatriate a
person without his consent by means of a statute providing that a
citizen should lose his citizenship for voting in a political election in
a foreign state. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
In 1940 Congress enacted a sweeping revision of the nationality
laws>V and expanded the provisions for expatriation 8 by specifying
certain acts which, if performed voluntarily, would result in loss of
citizenship. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of section 401(e)
of the 1940 Act in Perez v. Brownell,9 stating that withdrawal of
citizenship is "reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the power of Congress to achieve."' 0 The Court reasoned as
follows: Congress has implied power to deal with foreign affairs
as an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; this implied power,
plus the necessary and proper clause, empowers Congress to regulate
voting by American citizens in foreign elections; and, involuntary
expatriation is within the "ample scope" of "appropriate modes"
Congress can adopt to effectuate its general regulatory powers."
Dissenting from the Perez decision, Mr. Chief Justice Warren argued
that, although the citizen has the right voluntarily to renounce his
citizenship, the government was born of its citizens, and is with12
out power to sever the relationship that gives rise to its existence.
In a companion case, Trop v. Dulles,13 which dealt with the war
power of Congress to expatriate military deserters, the Court held
section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 194014 unconstitutional.
There was no majority opinion in Trop but the four justices who
dissented in Perez agreed that the government is without the power
to take one's citizenship away, and that deprivation of citizenship
7. Nationality Act of 1940. This Act has been modified and re-enacted as the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1964).
8. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 490; Citizenship Act of 1907, ch.
2534, §§ 2-3, 34 Stat. 1228.
9. 356 U.S. 44 (1958) (5-4 decision).
10. Id. at 60.
11. Id. at 57-60.
12. Id. at 64-66 (dissenting opinion). Chief Justice Warren also acknowledged that
"actions in derogation of undivided allegiance to this country" have "long been recognized" to result in expatriation. "Any action by which a citizen manifests allegiance
to a foreign state may be so inconsistent with the retention of citizenship as to result
in the loss of that status." Id. at 68. He argued, however, that the connection
between voting in a foreign political election and abandonment of citizenship was
not sufficient to support a presumption that the citizen had renounced his nationality.
Id. at 76.
13. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (5-4 decision).
14. "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (g) Deserting the military or naval service
of the United States in time of war, provided he is convicted thereof by a court
martial." (now § 349(8) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1481 (1964)).
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in this situation is a "cruel and unusual" punishment in violation of
the eighth amendment.' 5 Since 1958 the Court has consistently invalidated on a case-by-case basis various other statutory sections
providing for involuntary expatriation, but on each occasion it has
failed to define Congress' constitutional power in this area. In
the first instance the Court avoided the question of Congressional
power and based its decision on the ground that expatriation is a
punishment and the defendant had not been afforded the procedural
safeguards guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amendments. 16 In the
second case the Court recognized the power of Congress to expatriate
but declared that in this instance withdrawal of citizenship was not
reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the power of
Congress to achieve.@ In a 1964 decision an equally divided Court
upheld a statute which expatriated a citizen who served in the armed
forces of a foreign state.' 8
In the instant case the Court overruled Perez19 and appeared to
adopt the view set forth in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissent in that
case. 20 The Court declared that "in our country the people are
sovereign and the government cannot sever its relationship to the
people by taking away their citizenship." 21 Aside from the fourteenth
amendment, "the Constitution... grants Congress no express power
to strip people of their citizenship, whether in the exercise of the
implied power to regulate foreign affairs or in the exercise of any
specifically granted power."22 In addition, the Court noted that,
before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, views were ex15. The difference in result in this case was due to Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in which he stated that war power, unlike foreign affairs power, did not
justify a deprivation of citizenship.
16. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), which invalidated § 401(j)
of the Nationality Act of 1940 and § 349(a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 providing for denationalization of persons who leave the country in time
of war or national emergency in order to evade the draft.
17. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), which invalidated § 352(a)(1) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 providing for denationalization of a
naturalized citizen who returns to the country of his origin and remains for more
than three years.
18. Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963), af'd per curiam, 377 U.S.
214 (1964) (Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in decision).
19. As the dissent noted, the Court failed almost entirely to dispute the'-reasoning
in Perez. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (dissenting opinion) (5-4
decision).
20. The Court intimated, but did not expressly declare, that it adopted the reasoning
of the dissent of the Chief Justice in Perez. 387 U.S. at 267. See Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44, 79 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas); Trop v. -Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 91 (part I of the Court's opinion); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138
(concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
21. 387 U.S. at 257.
22. Id.

1344

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 20

pressed in Congress2 and by the Supreme Court2 4 that under the

Constitution the government had no power to specify acts which, if
performed voluntarily, would result in the loss of citizenship. Al-

though aware that these legislative and judicial statements might be
regarded as inconclusive and must be considered in their historical

context, the Court determined that any doubt as to the power of
Congress prior to the passage of the fourteenth amendment should
have been removed by the unequivocal terms of the amendment itself.

Recognizing that the undeniable purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to make citizenship of Negroes permanent and secure, the

Court stated that this purpose would be frustrated by holding that
the government could expatriate a citizen without his consent by
simply proceeding to act under an implied general power to regulate
foreign affairs. The Court, therefore, declared that the fourteenth

amendment defined "a citjzinship which a citizen keeps unless he
voluntarily relinquishes it,_ and concluded that section 401(e) of
the Nationality Act of 1940 was unconstitutional.
In this case the Court not only invalidated section 401(e) of the
1940 Act but also took the opportunity afforded by the case to
declare in broad terms the limits on Congress' constitutional powers
to expatriate a citizen. By adopting the viewpoint that the withdrawal of citizenship was not reasonably calculated to effect the end
which was in the power of Congress to achieve2 the Court could have
nullified section 401(e) and left the remainder of the Act intact.
Instead, the decision has effectually invalidated all but section 401(f)
of the Nationality Act of 1940 (which provided that a citizen shall
'lose" his nationality by "making a formal renunciation" of it).27
Although the opinion states that a citizen has "a constitutional right
23. On three occasions, in 1795, 1797 and 1818, Congress considered and rejected
proposals to enact laws which would describe certain conduct as resulting in expatriation. Id. at 257. The Court, however, made little mention of a proposed thirteenth
amendment in 1810 which was accepted by both Houses, and subsequently obtained
the approval of all but one of the requisite number of states. It provided that any
citizen who accepted a title of nobility, pension, or emolument from a foreign state,
or who married a person of royal blood, should "cease to be a citizen of the United
States." Roche, The Expatriation Cases, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 325, 335. Also no

mention was made of § 14 of the Wade-Davis bill, 6

RicuARDsoN,

MESSAES AND

PEnmEsm rs 226 (1899), or the Enrollment Act of 1865, 13 Stat, 490,
which specified acts which if performed voluntarily would result in expatriation. The
former was passed by both Houses; but not signed by President Lincoln before the
adjournment of Congress, and thus failed to become law.
24. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824)
(dictum).
25. 387 U.S. at 262.
26. Schneider v. Rusk, supra note 17.
27. "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (f) Making a formal renunciation of nationality
before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in foreign state, in such
form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State." (now §§ 349(6)-(7) of the
Tynrniorrntion and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1964)).
PAPERS OF THE
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to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship," 28 it does not articulate standards for determining what constitutes voluntary renunciation. The term "voluntary" has been employed to describe both a specific inteit? to renounce citizenship 29 and the uncoerced commission of an act conclusively deemed by law to be relinquishment of citizenship. 30 In
the first instance the right may be voluntarily relinquished or abandoned only by express language or by language and conduct that
conclusively show a subjective intent to renounce citizenship. Under
the latter view a competent adult may lose his citizenship by voluntarily and knowingly performing a specific overt act, with notice
of the resulting loss, regardless of the undisclosed intention of the
person doing it. Although it has not stated this explicitly, the Court
appears to have rejected the objective view. Whether the right has
been voluntarily relinquished is now a question which must be
determined on the facts of each case after a judicial trial in full
conformity with the Bill of Rights. Although Congress may provide
rules of evidence for such trials, it cannot declare that such equivocal
acts as service in a foreign army, participation in a foreign election or
desertion from our armed forces, establish conclusively an intention
to throw off American nationality.3 1 In essence the test to be applied
becomes subjective, with the practical result being that a citizen
cannot lose his citizenship unless he lactually desires to give it up.
The step taken by the Court might seem shocking in a country
where citizens are quick to protest actively governmental action,
especially in the area of foreign affairs. It will permit a citizen to
participate in the affairs of a foreign state, either internally or
externally. More importantly it means that a citizen who commits an
act of treason against or attempts by force to overthrow the United
States may, despite his actions, retain his citizenship. The ultimate
effect, however, should not prove unsettling, for the government still
retains other methods by which to regulate the areas over which it was
given control. For example, at present expatriation is only an additional penalty given to a person, who is convicted by court martial
or by a court of competent jurisdiction of desertion during time of
war, leaving the country to avoid the draft, or treason.32 This decision
strips the government only of the power to deprive the citizen of the
basic right from which his constitutional rights are derived.
28. 387 U.S. at 268.
29. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958).
30. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 497, 499-500 (1950); MacKenzie v.
Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915).
31. Of course such conduct may be highly persuasive evidence in the particular
case of an intent to abandon citizenship.
32. Expatriation, however, was the sole consequence of performing such acts as
entering or serving in the armed forces of a foreign state or voting in a political election
in a foreign state.
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Constitutional Law-State Constitutional Amendment
Guaranteeing Discretion to Seller
of Real Estate Violates Fourteenth Amendment
The California Constitution was amended in 1964 by an initiated
measure submitted to the people as Proposition 14, and passed by a
two-thirds majority.' The amendment became article I, section 26 of
the state constitution, and provided in part that, with an exception
for state owned property, "[n]either the state nor any subdivision or
agency thereof shall deny, limit, or abridge . . . the right of any
person ... to decline to sell, lease or rent [his real] property to such

person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses." 2 The
amendment in effect repealed the Unruh 3 and Rumford 4 Acts, which
had prohibited private discrimination in housing. Respondent, a Negro,
sought an injunction and damages against petitioner, a landlord, for
the latter's refusal to rent him an apartment solely on the basis of
his race. The trial court granted petitioner's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the Unruh Act, upon which respondent
relied, was rendered null and void by the adoption of the new amendment. The Supreme Court of California reversed5 on the ground
that section 26 was void as contrary to the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.6 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A state
constitutional amendment which, in effect, repeals laws prohibiting
1. The vote was 4,526,460 to 2,395,747. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 545,
413 P.2d 825, 836, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 892 (1966).
2. The amendment goes on to define "person," excluding any state agency; "property,"
excluding public accommodations such as hotels, motels, or other establishments
catering to transient guests; and it concludes with a severability clause. This severability clause was deemed inadequate to rescue the amendment. Id. at 544-45, 413 P.2d at
835-36, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 891-92.
3. CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 51-52 (West Supp. 1966), reads in relevant part as follows:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter
what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever." Section 52 prescribes criminal penalties for
violations of the preceding section.
4. Rumford Fair Housing Act, CAL. HEATH & SAI'. CoDE §§ 35700-44 (West
1967), prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale or rental of any private dwelling
containing more than four units, superseding the Hawkins Act, CAL. HEArT & SAF.
CODE §§ 35700-41 (1959), prohibiting racial discrimination in publicly assisted
housing.
5. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
6. The California court held that tested by the milieu in which it would operate
and by its "immediate objective," "ultimate impact," and "historical context," the
amendment tended to encourage racial discrimination in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. In finding the requisite presence of state action, the California court
held that although the amendment was adopted by the people through an initiated
ballot, the people were no less a state agency than the legislature or the courts in this

case. Id.
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private discrimination in housing, and thereby places the state in an
ostensibly neutral position regarding such discrimination, constitutes
a sufficient authorization by the state of such discrimination to violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
The fourteenth amendment prohibits racial discrimination only
when enforced by the state.7 The primary questions to be decided are
thus the definition of state action and whether state action is present
in a given situation. Early cases, such as McCabe v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. 8 and Nixon v. Condon,9 involved situations in which it was
readily apparent that the states, through legislative enactment, had
authorized discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
In Shelley v. Kraemer'0 the Supreme Court declared that state judicial
enforcement of otherwise private discrimination also constituted state
involvement. However, in cases in which state involvement was not
so readily apparent the Court has noted that the formulation of a
test by which to measure the "non-obvious involvement of the State" 11
is an "impossible task"l ' 2 and that determinations must be made on an
ad hoc basis. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority13 the State
of Delaware had allowed its private lessee to practice discrimination.
The Court there found a significant state involvement, holding that
the state had "abdicat[ed] its responsibilities" 14 under the fourteenth
amendment "by ignoring them or . . . failing to discharge them."' 5
Burton, and later Peterson v. City of Greenville16 and Robinson v.
Florida,1 7 took a subtle shift away from the earlier authorities in
7. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 1 (1883).
8. 235 U.S. 151 (1914). In this case the Court held that state statutes authorizing
interstate railroads to provide separate and unequal facilities for white and Negro
passengers violated the equal protection clause.
9. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). A Texas statute authorizing a political party executive committee to determine voting qualifications in state primary elections was held unconstitutional.
10. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenant
violates equal protection clause).
11. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
12. Id.
13. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
14. Id. at 725.
15. Id.
16. 373 U.S. 244 (1963). In this case, reversing the trespass convictions of Negro
civil rights demonstrators, the Court held that since it could not be determined whether
a private owner's request to Negroes to leave his property was based on personal
choice or on the compulsion of a city ordinance, the state was substantially involved,
and had removed the decision for or against segregation from the sphere of private
choice.
17. 378 U.S. 153 (1964). Reversing criminal trespass convictions of Negro demonstrators, the Court held that a state policy requiring separate rest room facilities in
restaurants catering to both races evidenced a state regulation and involvement sufficient to violate the equal protection clause.
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finding an authorization of discrimination, not by affirmative act, but
by refusal to act. Thus in Lombard v. Louisiana,18 the city's failure
to renounce unofficial statements of city officials concerning their
intent to bar integration led the Court to find that the city was
affirmatively involved in discrimination. Although the fourteenth
amendment does not expressly require the states to seek out and
eliminate private discrimination, 19 but rather forbids the states affirmatively to involve themselves, it is clear that the Court has found
implied involvement in situations such as Burton and Lombard. Thus
the prohibition placed upon the states by the fourteenth amendment
has grown increasingly broad in discrimination cases, moving from
affirmative action to the lack of affirmative action in cases where a
failure to act amounts to a tacit approval by the state.
Addressing itself to the problems of defining and discovering state
involvement in the instant case, the Court noted at the outset that
the states are not required to enact sanctions prohibiting private racial
discrimination." It further observed that a state which has enacted
such legislation may repeal it without violating the fourteenth amendment.21 However, in underlining the gravity of the amendment's
effect, the Court marked a distinction between a legislative repealer
and a constitutional amendment with the effect of a repealer. The
Court stated that although section 26 is neutral on its face, when
viewed in conjunction with its purpose and effect, it has a "wider
impact than the mere repealing of the statutes." Rather than erasing
a constitutionally optional statute, and thus returning the status quo,
the amendment instead was held to announce "[t]he right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds, . . .
embodied in the state's basic charter, immune from legislative,
executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government."22 In support of its definition of state involvement, the Court
approved without comment the California court's finding of no
distinction between an act of the legislature and an initiated
measure submitted to and passed by the people, holding that
the people of the state are as much a state agency as the legislature or the courts.P Thus the majority concluded first that, consid18. 373 U.S. 273 (1963).
19. See, e.g., Williams v. Howard Johnsons, Inc., 323 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1963),
in which the court dismissed the damages action of a Negro denied service by the
defendant restaurant, stating that "to accept plaintiff's proposition that the failure of
the state to provide a remedy for the redress of complaints of deprivation of the equal
protection of the law would be totally to emasculate existing case law." Id. at 106.
20. 387 U.S. at 374-75.
21. Id. at 376.
22. Id. at 377.
23. Although the Court did not expressly adopt the reasoning of the California court
on this point, the decision could have been reached by no other means. Shelley v.
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ering the weight which a constitutional amendment carries, in contrast
to that of a statute, and the practical roadblocks to its repeal, the
adoption of section 26 imputes to the state "affirmative action designed to make private discrimination legally possible."2 In addition,
the Court concluded that although the amendment was neutral on its
face, weight must be given to its effect, as determined by the surrounding circumstances, and that, viewed in this light, section 26
would tend to "encourage and significantly involve the state in private
discrimination."' 5 Justice Harlan, dissenting,2 argued that there was
no distinction between legislative and constitutional repeal of optional
statutes, and that there was especially no basis for such a distinction
here, since section 26 was neutral on its fdce'. The dissent further took
issue with the majority's approach, by which it examined not the
existing laws alone, but the ultimate impact of section 26 on the
California environment, supported in the record only by facts
"found"27 by the California Supreme Court.
The instant decision represents a significant extension of the
state involvement principle to the passage of a state constitutional
amendment which, rather than affirmatively encouraging discrimination, makes private discrimination legally possible. In finding the
requisite state involvement, it is particularly significant that the
Court chose to adopt the reasoning of the California court in which
the overall character of the California political and sociological
climate 28 was examined in determining that section 26 would, and was
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which could easily have been held dispositive of the
instant case, was not relied on at all. The logical implication of that decision is to
allow relief from any private discrimination merely by attacking it in a state court;
once on record as approving private discrimination, the state court has placed the
state's authority behind the decision, just as § 26 places the state's authority behind
the right therein set out. However, since the Court refused to follow Shelley, they
must have accepted the California Supreme Court's definition of the state agency
involved in the instant case to support their further reasoning as to the effect of the
amendment.
24. 387 U.S. at 375. The Court referred to Hill v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 757, 413 P.2d
852, 50 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1966), decided the same day as Mulkey v. Reitman, 64
Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), to illustrate the discriminatory
effect of § 26, regardless of its apparent neutrality. In that case a Negro tenant sued
to restrain an eviction from a leased, single family dwelling. The notice to quit served
on him by the owner expressly recited: "The sole reason for this notice is that I
have decided to exercise the right conferred on me by Article I, Section 26, California
Constitution, to rent said premises to members of the Caucasian race."
25. 387 U.S. at 376.
26. Justice Harlan was joined by justices Black, Clark and Stewart.
27. 387 U.S. at 387.
28. "A state enactment cannot be construed for purposes of constitutional analysis
without concern for its immediate objective . . . and for its ultimate effect. . . . To
determine [its] validity . . .it must be viewed in light of its historical context and
the conditions existing prior to its enactment." 64 Cal. 2d at 533-34, 413 P.2d at
828, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 884. Among such prior conditions, of course, was the existence
of the Rumford and Unruh Acts.
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intended to, create an atmosphere conducive to discrimination. Although there was certainly state action in the mechanics of the electoral process, in which the state provided ballots and polling places
and certified the votes, the Court chose rather to find state involvement primarily in the potentially discriminatory effect of the amendment. It is significant that the Court considered the prospective effect
of an amendment neutral on its face in order to discover state involvement in private discriminatory conduct. Tenuous as this ground for
the holding may be, this is not to suggest that the Court has overstepped its bounds, but rather that it has chosen to face more realistically the operative facts of the case.29 Section 26 is certainly ambiguous, and could be interpreted as either a mere reiteration of the privilege to discriminate privately or as an affirmative announcement that
the state will not interfere in, and thus will encourage discrimination."
However, even the former interpretation, when viewed in light of
the use to which the Court finds the measure will be put, presents
state involvement by placing the power of the state behind those who
would discriminate under it.

Criminal Law-The "Mere Evidence" Rule
Is Expressly Abolished
In "hot pursuit" of an armed robber, police entered, with permission,
the residence of the defendant.' While searching the basement for the
suspect one officer discovered a jacket and trousers which fit the
description given by witnesses of the clothes worn by the robber. The
clothes were seized and introduced into evidence against the defendant and he was convicted: Defendant contended that the seized
clothing was improperly admitted in evidence because the items had
29. On this point Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, quoted from 5
WmTics oF JAMEs MADISON 272 (Hunt ed. 1904): "In our Government the real
power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is a mere instrument of the
major number of the Constituents." 387 U.S. at 387.
30. In support of the Court's finding that section 26 would tend to promote discrimination, it is interesting to note the word "decline" in the amendment, thereby
comprehending the discriminatory corollary of free choice on its face, rather than
attempting to avoid the issue by omitting the word, and leaving the amendment more
arguably neutral, while accomplishing the same purpose.
1. These are the circumstances from which the Court found a "hot pursuit" situation:
Two cab drivers, attracted by shouts of "holdup," followed the defendant to his resi-

dence. This information was relayed to the police who were proceeding to the scene
of the robbery. Within minutes police arrived at the house in a number of patrol
cars. An officer knocked and announced their presence. The wife of the defendant
answered and offered no objection to their request to search the house.
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"evidential value only" and therefore were not lawfully subject to
seizure.2 After unsuccessful state court proceedings 3 the defendant
was denied federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District
Court of Maryland. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
followed the "mere evidence" rule 4 and reversed, though recognizing
the validity of the search. On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. The fourth amendment 6 is not violated by the
seizure of items of "evidential value only" when there is probable
cause to conduct a search and it is reasonable to believe that such
evidence will result in conviction of the suspect. Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
In Gouled v. United States7 the Supreme Court established the
cmere evidence" rule, holding that search warrants "may not be used
as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers
solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be
." In setting
used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding ..
out the rule the Court relied primarily on the fourth amendment, but
declared that the admission in evidence of a paper so obtained compelled a person to be a witness against himself in violation of the fifth
amendment. The Court held the seizure of the defendant's papers to
be unreasonable because of the purpose for which they were seized
(mere evidence) and concluded that to permit their use in evidence
would compel the defendant to become a witness against himself.
This intertwining of the protections of the fourth and fifth amendments
to establish a rule against the seizure of merely evidentiary material
evolved from Boyd v. United States.9 In Boyd the Court recognized
2. Defendant's claim is based on what is generally referred to as the "mere evidence"
rule. Essentially, the rule is that during a search items may not be seized from an
individual "solely for use as evidence of crime." United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452, 464 (1932).
3. Defendant did not appeal from his conviction. He first sought relief by an
application under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act which was denied
without hearing. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing.
Hayden v. Warden, 233 Md. 613, 195 A.2d 692 (1963). The trial court denied relief
after the hearing, concluding "that the search of his home and seizure of the articles
in question were proper." 387 U.S. at 296 n.2.
4. See note 2 supra.
5. The Court of Appeals believed Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947),
sustained the validity of the search. There the Court upheld an intensive five-hour
search (subsequent to arrest) which turned up "instrumentalities of crime" (draft
cards, the possession of which was a federal offense) as a proper search incidental
to an arrest.
6. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
7. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
8. Id. at 309.
9. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination had been
denied the defendant when he was compelled to produce invoices
showing the quantity and value of glass allegedly fraudulently imported into the United States. The opinion, however, made reference
to the violation of both the fourth and fifth amendments, 10 enabling
the Court in Gouled to use Boyd's fourth amendment rationale to
establish the "mere evidence" rule. In Harris v. United States" Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson delineated the boundaries of the rule in distinguishing between merely evidentiary materials which may not be
seized and instrumentalities of crime, fruits of crime, weapons to aid
escape and contraband which may be seized.'2 Blood was the subject
of the search in Schmerber v. California.13 There the Court held that
the fifth amendment privilege ".

.

. protects an accused only from

being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the
State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and
that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in
this case did not involve compulsion to these ends."14 The evidence
(blood) did not fit the technical classifications of fruits or instrumentalities of crime or contraband. By recognizing that the blood
was taken only for its evidential value, and by finding that the taking
of the blood involved a search and seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment, the Court thus removed fourth amendment support for the "mere evidence" rule. By finding blood non-testimonial
or non-communicative the Court, in effect, withdrew fifth amendment
support for the rule as well, at least as applied to cases involving an
intrusion on the physical body. Clothing was dealt with in Holt V.
United States,'5 where a prisoner was forced to put on a blouse to
see if it fit him. The Court recognized that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was limited to evidence of a communicative or testimonial nature, Mr. Justice Holmes stating that "the
prohibition . .. is . . . of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from . . . [the defendant], not an exclusion
10. "Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of
aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or
of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his
goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth
and Fifth amendments run almost into each other." Id. at 630. "And we have been
unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in
evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself." Id. at 633.
11. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
12. Id. at 154. The rule is often stated fruits, instrumentalities and contraband,
including weapons in the category of instrumentalities.
13. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
14. Id. at 761.
15. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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of his body as evidence when it may be material." 16 However, no
unanimity of opinion has prevailed regarding the classification of
articles of clothing; cases have inconsistently held clothing to constitute mere evidence of criminal activity 17 or instrumentalities of the
8
crime.'
The Court in the instant case found that the circumstances created
a "hot pursuit" situation which made possible a valid search without
a warrant. 9 By determining that clothing was not "testimonial" or
"communicative" in nature, the Court concluded that the fifth amendment did not apply. Pointing out that there is nothing in the language
of the fourth amendment to support a distinction between "mere
evidence" and instrumentalities, fruits of crime or contraband, the
Court reasoned that privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit or contraband. But, "[t]here must,
of course, be a nexus . .
between the item to be seized and
2
0
criminal behavior."
The Court said that Schmerber settled the
proposition that it is reasonable, within the terms of the fourth
amendment, to conduct otherwise constitutionally permissible searches
for the purpose of obtaining evidence which would aid in apprehending and convicting criminals. The majority felt the probable
cause and particularity requirements of the fourth amendment and
the intervention of a "neutral and detached magistrate ...,"2 would
provide adequate protection from intrusions upon privacy. In a
separate opinion Mr. Justice Fortas opposed repudiation of the "mere
evidence" rule, believing it was needed to protect fourth amendment
prohibition against general searches, but concurred in the decision on
the ground that identifying clothing worn in commission of a crime
and seized during "hot pursuit" is within the principle and spirit of
the "hot pursuit" exception to the search warrant requirement.'
16. Id. at 252-53.
17. In United States v. Richmond, 57 F. Supp. 903, 907 (S.D.W. Va. 1944), the
seizure of articles of clothing was held improper because they were "innocent" in
nature and lawfully in defendant's possession. In La Rue v. State, 149 Tex. Crim.
598, 197 S.W.2d 570 (1946), blood spattered clothing was held to be mere evidence
of criminal activity, and therefore inadmissible.
18. In United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d I (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950
(1958), shoes were held to be instrumentalities since they facilitate escape. In Morton
v. United States, 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 875 (1945), blood
stained clothing was allowed to be taken from accused's closet and introduced in evidence at a murder trial.
19. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).

"...

the exigencies of the

situation made that course imperative." Id. at 456.
20. 387 U.S. at 307.
21. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
22. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a lengthy dissent, renewed his opposition to the
Schmerber decision by reiterating that "[t]hat which is taken from a person without
his consent and used as testimonial evidence violates the fifth amendment." 387 U.S.
at 320.
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The Court's abolishment of the "mere evidence" rule should boost
the effectiveness of law enforcement without any concomitant sacrifice
of the individual's right to privacy. So long as the search is reasonable,
which the fourth amendment requires regardless of what is found, a
person's privacy is invaded no more by the discovery of clothing than
by the discovery of "fruits, instrumentalities or contraband."2 In
short, the "mere evidence" rule afforded no protection against exploratory searches by police and served as nothing more than an illogical
impediment to the gathering and use of relevant evidence, 24 reasonably
seized, which was not barred if a "fruit, instrumentality or contraband," but was barred if of "evidential value only." Consequently,
courts now will be relieved of the necessity of fitting items of material
evidence into one of these previously excepted categories. With this
enlargement of the scope of what may be searched for, the probable
cause25 and particularity requirements assume increasingly important
roles, especially in "hot pursuit" situations. Since the officer in a
"hot pursuit" search and seizure has not identified with particularity
the items for which he will search and seize, and thus is not restricted
by a warrant, the probable cause and particularity requirements must,
in retrospect, be stringently applied to prevent police officers from
rummaging through a suspect's home and personal belongings merely
in hopes of finding incriminating evidence.2 6 The holding here eliminates a source of much confusion and inconsistency, and, in effect,
removes from the courts a sanctuary for the guilty. But the decision
must be viewed with cautious alarm. Now, it appears, an officer acting
legitimately without a warrant will have a broader capacity to search
and seize than if he had a warrant, since in order to satisfy the fourth
amendment an officer acting with a warrant must describe with
particularity what he intends to seize. This is in direct opposition to
the Court's traditional position of looking with disfavor upon warrant23. "The rationale most frequently suggested for the rule preventing the seizure of
evidence is that 'limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest
itself.' . . . But privacy 'would be just as well served by a restriction on search to the
even-numbered days of the month . . . And it would have the extra advantage of
avoiding hair-splitting questions . ...
Id. at 309.
24. The accused himself established the relevancy of the clothing in this case by
taking them off and putting them in the washing machine in the basement.
25. "[Iln the case of 'mere evidence' probable cause must be examined in terms of
cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or
conviction. In so doing, consideration of police purposes will be required. Cf. Kreman
v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 [1957]. [Here] ... police . . . could reasonably believe
that the items would aid in identification of the culprit." 387 U.S. at 307.
26. Albert R. Turnbull, counsel for the defendant, believed the readiness of the
Court to create a "hot pursuit" search from the facts here may in the long run prove
to be the most important aspect of the case. Letter from Albert R. Turnbull to
VA,D n'mrLT LAw REvIv, June 29, 1967.
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less searches.27 Such approval of a more or less general search and
seizure, plus the Court's readiness to identify the factual situation
here as "hot pursuit," may be an indication of a new willingness on the
part of the Court to come to the assistance of 'good faith" law enforcement.
27. "In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 [(1960)], this Court, strongly
supporting the preference to be accorded searches under a warrant, indicated in a
doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without
one it would fall. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 [(1948)], and Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 [(1961)], the Court, in condemning searches by
officers who invaded premises without a warrant, plainly intimated that had the
proper course of obtaining a warrant from a magistrate been followed and had the
magistrate on the same evidence available to the police made a finding of probable
cause, the search under the warrant 'would have been sustained." United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).

